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Abstract. The following essay aims to analyze the problem of repetition in the reflec-
tion of Walter Benjamin. Showing first of all how this concept, singularly neglected 
by critics, is the unexpected centre towards which the philosopher’s entire reflection 
converges, thus offering a new reading of his entire production. All the vast domains 
of Benjamin’s speculation are thoroughly rethought starting from this idea, revealing 
how what is at stake is a more articulated movement of the eternal recurrence of the 
same, which characterizes mythical temporality. A movement that has to do with the 
constitution of the human and which indeed exhibits an intimate link between rep-
etition and innovation, repetition and the constructive principle. Another intention of 
this text is therefore to carry out an in depth analysis of this connection, to question 
the nature of such a gesture, both repetitive and differential, and its relationship with 
the recurrence of the ever self-same, therefore with the possible way out of the myth.
Keywords. Benjamin, repetition, innovation, eternal recurrence, constructive principle.
Throughout his whole theoretical reflection, Walter Benja-
min never ceased to focus his attention on the problem of repeti-
tion: although treated, for the most part, in the form of fragmen-
tary annotations, illuminating as much as they are short and often 
hermetic, this issue serves as the backdrop to many of the funda-
mental ideas developed by Benjamin, innervating them and thus 
constituting a decisive conceptual nexus. Without ever being the-
matised in an essay or in a specific work, the concept of repetition 
runs through all of Benjamin’s production, from his early writ-
ings to his late works. Yet, in the now vast and critical bibliogra-
phy available, attempts to analyze this notion are very rare. Many, 
in fact, have dealt with this problem mostly indirectly and in pass-
ing: it is the case of some articles that have tried to establish inter-
esting but also fleeting comparisons with other authors – for exam-
ple with Kierkegaard (Katz [1998]), with Derrida (Angehrn [2001]) 
or Einstein (Haxthausen [2004]) –, or works that focus mainly on 
the question of historical temporality or on modernity (Guglielmi-
netti [1990]; Kaufmann [2002]; in part Fenves [2011]: 103-124). The 
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text that follows, which sums up the results of a 
broader research conducted in recent years (Mon-
tanelli [2017]), therefore aims primarily to offer 
a survey – a concise one – of Benjamin’s reflec-
tion on the topic. In this sense, the analysis will 
be, in part, also a chronological one. From a the-
matic point of view the text will be articulated on 
the basis of three fundamental axes: the first one 
can be defined as gnoseological and, at the same 
time, ontological, in that it moves from Benjamin’s 
conceptualization of the notions of repetition and 
myth, and will allow to analyze the relationship 
between repetition, language, knowledge and his-
tory; the second has a anthropological-aesthetic 
quality, insofar as it will focus on the link between 
repetition, perception and construction of the 
symbolic space; the third will allow to return to 
the problem of history, in connection with that 
of political praxis and revolution, and finally to 
deal with the ethical question concerning happi-
ness and its relationship with the gesture repeating 
what has been.
The present work, therefore, does not intend 
to be merely a historical-philological work; on 
the contrary, the attempt is to analyze the philo-
sophical range of the concept of repetition. The 
article intends to highlight how repetition consti-
tutes a key idea of Benjamin’s thought and how, 
contrary to what the main critical contributions 
have claimed, it does not pertain only to the eter-
nal recurrence of the same; indeed the aim is to 
answer the question concerning the possibility of 
another repetition, exactly the one that shows an 
intimate connection with the constructive princi-
ple, with variation, with what is new.
1. THE TWO METAPHYSICAL PRINCIPLES OF 
REPETITION
In the ferment of Benjamin’s university years, 
when he joined the Jugendbewegung and the circle 
of Gustav Wyneken, in the first texts published in 
the periodicals of the student movement, we can 
witness the emergence of the concept of repeti-
tion in Benjamin’s thought. In fact, the problem of 
time, of the relationship between present and past, 
between tradition, historical repetition and trans-
formative action, captures his attention right from 
the start.
The crisis of the Wilhelminian values, of the 
German aristocracy and bourgeoisie, had caused 
the younger generations to pose questions about 
change, about the possibility of new social and 
cultural upheavals. It was in such a climate that 
Benjamin shared and embraced the idea that the 
awakening from this state of general decadence 
could come only from a pedagogical renewal, 
from the revision of all values on the part of youth 
(see Benjamin [1911a]: 26-32). Renewal and revi-
sion – Benjamin states in these first pages – must 
entail, first and foremost, a radical opposition to 
the «pious reiteration or regurgitation» of the tra-
dition taught in schools and universities (Benjamin 
[1913a]: 94). Also, and above all, this opposition 
must be against the last illusion generated by a cer-
tain interpretation of Darwinism, that of historical 
evolution. Already here Benjamin lays the ground-
work for his critique of the concept of progress: 
behind the idea of  a continuous and ineluctable 
advancement, in fact, he identifies the tired repeti-
tion of what has been; behind the ideas of ration-
ality and tolerance typical of enlightened socialism 
he envisaged the dogmatic rigidity of religion, and 
the hindrance to revolutionary action in a wait-
and-see attitude (Benjamin [1912]: 70, 65). 
In this period Nietzsche is the fundamental 
author with whom Benjamin tries to reflect on the 
interruption of the gesture which is limited to reit-
erating what exists: indeed, following the Second 
Untimely Meditation, one must «use the past for 
life and […] refeashion what has happened into 
history» (Nietzsche [1874]: 11). It is not, there-
fore, so much the movement of a drastic break 
that constitutes the way out of the circle of repeti-
tion, but, on the contrary, a true broadening of the 
latter, which, however, must be oriented and fil-
tered by the present: youth capable of critical his-
tory – according to the renowned tripartition of 
history in monumental, antiquarian and critical 
(Nietzsche [1874]: 14-22) – repeats and resumes 
the events of the past which release a «construc-
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tive drive» (Nietzsche [1874]: 38), and serve the 
transformative action of today. The tired rumina-
tion of what has been must be replaced by a selec-
tive oblivion, «able to forget at the right time as 
well as to remember at the right time» (Nietzsche 
[1874]: 10). The «center, where the new comes 
into being» (Benjamin [1914a]: 168) is thus to be 
found in the same dynamics of repetition; howev-
er, it may be grasped only if youth – or the criti-
cal historian – places himself «on the threshold of 
the moment» (Nietzsche [1874]: 9), if the present 
becomes actual again, manifesting the «hurry to 
act» in each and every instant (Benjamin [1913c]: 
123). To swim counter current, «against the his-
torical waves» (Nietzsche [1874]: 49) – here one 
cannot but think of the later «to brush history 
against the grain» of the seventh thesis (Benjamin 
[1940a]: 392) – is the primary gesture to interrupt, 
on the one hand, the litany of «the eternal Yes-
terday that always was and always returns» (Ben-
jamin [1911b]: 41), and, on the other, to avoid 
drowning in the waters of progress.
The core of every progressive ideology – the 
representation of time as a continuous and quali-
tatively homogeneous line – is indeed shattered. 
In a well-known passage of The Life of Students 
Benjamin presents his very first elaborations of 
an idea of an intensive time, qualitatively dif-
ferentiated, also influenced by messianic sugges-
tions present in these writings. It is the time of 
the «immanent state of perfection», «in which his-
tory appears to be concentrated in a single focal 
point», the elements of which must be made to 
emanate from the bosom of «every present» (Ben-
jamin [1915a]: 37). On a subjective level, it is the 
same temporality that, in The Metaphysics of Youth 
Benjamin identifies in diaristic writing: the sus-
pension of the «calendar time, clock time, and 
stock-exchange time» typical of a diary, allows to 
experience temporality in its purest state; written 
«at intervals», it interrupts the «chain of experi-
ences» and its pauses allow things to be illuminat-
ed by «timelessness» (Benjamin [1914b]: 11-12). A 
diary demands completeness: «It is the unfathom-
able document of a life never lived, the book of a 
life in whose time everything that we experienced 
inadequately is transformed into experience per-
fected». It is because «events showed themselves 
to be undecided» (Benjamin [1914b]: 11, 15) that 
Benjamin can allude to the redemptive and imma-
nent state of perfection.
From these reflections contained in his ear-
ly writings, after the rift between Benjamin and 
Wyneken, the problem of repetition thus began 
to be interwoven with a concept that Benjamin 
never ceased to address: the concept of myth. The 
mythical dimension appears to Benjamin as a 
totality of meaning that devours everything, that 
does not tolerate anything outside of itself, and 
therefore, as a dimension that is immediately that 
of destiny: the governing principle of «ananke» 
guides the mythical world, its ineluctable force 
rests on «the supreme sovereignty of relationship» 
(Benjamin [1915b]: 22, 34; see also Menninghaus 
[1986]: 94-97). It is this binding trait that, accord-
ing to Benjamin, constitutes the violent aspect 
of the structure of myth: what dominates is the 
«chain of guilt and atonement», which ties human 
beings, condemning them to the eternal repeti-
tion of the same (Benjamin [1919]: 203). It is not 
a dead structure, typical only of archaic socie-
ties, on the contrary, its remains are visible in the 
contemporary world: moreover, law is mythical, 
and in setting its boundaries, it always assigns a 
destiny, or an infinite circularity triggered by the 
dispositif of debt of advanced capitalism. In fact, 
law is both the origin and expression of mythical 
forces. Mentioning a passage in The Ethics of Pure 
Will by Hermann Cohen, Benjamin describes the 
legal system as a fatal dispositif to which nothing 
escapes: the original gesture of law, in fact, is such 
that «orders themselves seem to cause and bring 
about […] infringement» (Benjamin [1921a]: 
249). This is where violence and, at the same time, 
power1 rest: the seizure of man inside a de-human-
izing vortex. In this sense Benjamin can write that 
in the domain of law «it is not [...] really man who 
has a fate» (Benjamin [1919]: 204), «the marked 
bearer of guilt» is, rather, «mere life» (bloßes Le-
1 As is known, the term Gewalt indicates both the sphere 
of violence and that of authority, of power.
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ben), that life which, caught in its only natural 
and non-historical existence, is rendered helpless 
in the face of this gesture (Benjamin [1921a]: 251, 
250). Every juridical institution preserves in itself, 
in a more or less latent form, this original vio-
lence, better, it repeats its primordial gesture. So 
capitalism, in the 1921 fragment, displays the last 
and perhaps most terrifying sneer of the tempo-
rality of destiny: indeed it expels any transcend-
ent element, to incorporate everything, including 
God, into its own demonic plan of immanence, 
paced by the monotonous rhythm of guilt and 
debt (Schuld). Unlike the pagan rite, whose cir-
cular course still entails interruptions aimed at 
regenerating the same mythical order, capitalism 
needs no pauses ‒ there is no need of weekdays, 
what is left is only gruesome festive days (Ben-
jamin [1921b]: 288-291) ‒, it is the realization of 
«only one fate» (Benjamin [1921a]: 242).
Eternal recurrence seems to correspond to the 
historical time that Benjamin described also in his 
study on Baroque and its dramas: a temporality in 
which the Christian conception of history, under-
stood as historia salutis, is shattered, in which the 
historical process itself is devoured by nature, by 
an unstoppable advance towards decay and catas-
trophe, cancelled and incorporated into a deter-
ministic closure that eliminates any distinctions 
of time and renders everything simultaneous (see 
also Benjamin [1919]: 204), and in which eve-
rything repeats itself identical to itself. In fact, a 
careful examination of the two early texts dat-
ing to 1916, on tragedy and on Trauerspiel, which 
contain a first reflection on the concepts then cen-
tral in Benjamin’s habilitation study, reveals a dis-
tinction between «two metaphysical principles of 
repetition»: «the circle» and «the fact of duality» 
(Benjamin [1916a]: 60). The first is the spherical 
movement of the mythical system, a cyclic pro-
cess that regenerates and reconfirms, each time 
from the beginning, the totality of meaning; a 
movement masterfully described by Benjamin’s 
friend Florens Christian Rang who wrote about 
the Babylonian rite of carnival: here the euphoria 
connected to the festivity, to the act of turning the 
world upside down, is nothing but a ritual pause, 
an interregnum functional to the restoration of the 
Cycle and of Order, a momentary appearance of 
the original chaos, which is then repressed to re-
legitimate the establishment of the world-system. 
In other words, in myth also interruptions are rep-
etitions: of the primordial gesture of creation that 
transforms chaos into cosmos (see Rang [1927]; 
see also Eliade [1949]). This is also what is staged 
by the Attic tragedy in which the death of the hero 
is both allusion to the suspension of such an order 
– a titanic revolt against it – and a return to the 
identical – it is impossible to bear such a break 
individually –, to a new and more powerful legiti-
mation of the «magic circle» of myth (Benjamin 
[1916b]: 56; Benjamin [1925]: 100-118). The tragic 
trait lies precisely in the fact that the hero, despite 
his act of accusation of the entire pantheon, can-
not overturn it, and the old mythical statutes 
are eventually restored. According to a beautiful 
expression in Lukács’s The Metaphysics of Tragedy, 
what is at stake is a «fight for history», destined to 
fail (Lukács [1911]: 167).
The second metaphysical principle of repeti-
tion, duality, does not so much concern the cir-
cular movement that encompasses everything, 
but the creatural and «historical life» (Benjamin 
[1925]: 62), with the endless and ghostly dupli-
cation that sets in after the expulsion from para-
dise, exemplarily represented by Trauerspiel (Ben-
jamin [1916b]: 57; Benjamin [1916a]: 60). This 
repetition is rooted in Benjamin’s speculation on 
language and in his re-reading of the biblical epi-
sode of the fall of man. The primary reference is 
to the essay On Language as Such and on the Lan-
guage of Man, which, it must be noted, is coeval 
with the two texts on tragedy and Trauerspiel. The 
pure immediacy of the name, shattered by the will 
to judge what is good and bad ‒ this is the true 
original sin ‒, delivers a multiple and ambigu-
ous eruption of signifiers and signs, in Benjamin’s 
work on the Baroque, where the symbol becomes 
allegory (Benjamin [1916c]: 70-73; Benjamin 
[1925]: 159-177). It is the origin of judgment, and 
it is here that repetition emerges as a category of 
reality, knowledge and time: the breakage of the 
theological-symbolic unity between sensible and 
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supersensible, name and essence, makes room for 
propositional knowledge that shatters the object of 
knowledge into the chaotic and spectral crowd of 
its inessential signifiers, of its allegorical schema-
ta, repeating them relentlessly (Benjamin [1916b]: 
57). According to the image of an «irresistible 
decay», this is the rhythm of the post-Edenic his-
tory and of the Baroque (Benjamin [1925]: 178). 
«It is this repetition on which the law of mourning 
play is founded» (Benjamin [1916b]: 57).
The salvation from this eternal return of catas-
trophe can be reached, then, only exasperating the 
gesture of this repetition until it is overturned. The 
translator and the allegorist are the two emblemat-
ic figures who perform a similar act of excavation 
inside language and being, who bring to light the 
possibility of variation and novelty, starting from 
a type of replication that is already and always a 
technique of combination and construction (Benja-
min [1925]: 178-179; 187-188; Benjamin [1921c]: 
253-263). They both open up a gap, a space of 
play (Spiel-Raum), in which from the «eccentric 
embrace of meaning», from the «antinomies of 
the allegorical» (Benjamin [1925]: 202, 174), from 
the ruins of the shattered totality, it is possible to 
see a way out: in the always differing composi-
tion of these same fragments, in fact, resides the 
possibility of building «a new whole» (Benjamin 
[1925]: 178), grasping, as a fleeting crystallization 
of repetitive praxis, the eternal in the transient. 
Both move in the dialectics between uniqueness 
and repetition (Einmaligkeit und Wiederholung) 
immanent in the origin (Ursprung) which Ben-
jamin writes about in the Epistemo-Critical Pro-
logue of his Trauerspielbuch (Benjamin [1925]: 46). 
The translator, assuming an «intensive aiming» 
towards language (Benjamin [1910-1940]: 80), 
lingers in repetition, until he nears the Ausdrucks-
lose, «the expressionless» – remains which cannot 
be communicated – and is also the origin of every 
signification, which breaks «the false […] totality» 
and reopens the domain of possibility (Benjamin 
[1922]: 340; see also Benjamin [1921c]: 261; Ben-
jamin [1916c]: 66). He becomes immersed in the 
domain of the signs of language, dissects its ele-
ments to reassemble them and tell them different-
ly, and eliminates the ineffable (Benjamin [1910-
1940]: 80), taking the absence of reference to its 
extreme consequences, to the point that the echo 
of the names resound again, the pure expressive 
capacity of being, which Benjamin also calls reine 
Sprache (pure language) (Benjamin [1921c]: 256, 
259-262; Benjamin [1916c]: 65). Thus the allego-
rist broadens the repetition by playing with the 
same allegory and with its technical-constructive 
essence, he subverts the mourning of the recur-
rence of the same in the playful joy of variation. 
His is an «ars inveniendi» which translates the 
bewilderment of the «mystical instant» and of the 
symbol into the profane «‘now’ of contemporary 
actuality» in which the possible is again «open to 
all kinds of revision by the interpretative artist» 
(Benjamin [1925]: 179, 183).
2. ANTHROPOLOGY OF REPETITION
From these premises the question arises con-
cerning the relationship between repetition and 
construction of experience, that is, of symbolic 
space. Here I will move from that series of writ-
ings dedicated to childhood that Benjamin worked 
on in the second half of the 1920s (so before Ber-
lin Childhood around 1900), texts that are gener-
ally treated as minor composition by critics (and 
by Benjamin himself), because they are considered 
inferior to the rest of Benjamin’s production, but 
that, on the contrary, have a philosophical depth 
of their own. In them it is indeed possible to grasp 
the echo of the new «Marxist dialectical anthropol-
ogy», yet to be founded (Benjamin [1929a]: 275).
In the more general impulse to play (Benjamin 
[1928a]: 28), Benjamin envisages something that 
is decisive for the comprehension of man in his 
entirety: what is being experimented, in the first 
gestures of play, is what he calls «basic rhythms» 
of vital formations, «a transition to a more pre-
cise definition» of things (Benjamin [1928b]: 120, 
118). What emerges in the foreground is a con-
structiveness intrinsic to childhood play: children, 
in fact, while playing, are constructing the world, 
and in this sense they are attracted by detritus 
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generated by buildings, gardening, housework, tai-
loring, by waste products, by things that are being 
visibly worked on (Benjamin [1926]: 449). Here 
too, we are dealing with the action of combining, 
with an original technical element, a praxis that, 
in the continuous destruction and re-composition 
of objects, alone, can create a «vibrant relation-
ship» with them (Benjamin [1930]: 123). In oth-
er words, this gesture is about the foundation of 
the objectual world and of subjectivity. And «the 
great law» that regulates and guides this gesture 
is «the law of repetition» (das Gesetz der Wieder-
holung) (Benjamin [1928b]: 120). If, on the one 
hand, Freud understood how powerful this law 
is, so much that he spoke of what is Beyond the 
Pleasure Principle, on the other hand, he also saw 
the repetition compulsion as a direct expression 
of the death drive, of the essentially «conserva-
tive»  nature of living beings (Freud [1921]: 45)2. 
For Benjamin, on the contrary, the ludic repetition 
of children has to do with what makes a life possi-
ble: with the construction of experience, and with 
all those habits that form the necessary condition 
for any kind of orientation of an existence (Benja-
min [1928b]: 120). The rhythm of a child’s play is 
not set by the eternal recurrence of rite, rather it 
follows a beat that, in each of its repetitions, cre-
ates discontinuity, clinamen3.
Rite and play are not two clearly distinct areas, 
on the contrary, there is a tension between them, 
which originates from a deep affinity: these phe-
nomena are both constitutive of what is properly 
human, they have to do with man’s need for ori-
entation and protection, with the institution of 
what we call world; and yet they are gestures that 
provide antithetical answers to this same need. 
Benjamin’s starting point is this original tension: 
after all, «the oldest toys [...] are in a certain sense 
imposed on […] [a child] as cult implements that 
became toys only afterward» (Benjamin [1928b]: 
2 For a more in-depth reflection on Freud and Benjamin 
see Werner (2015) and also Montanelli (2017): 70-78.
3 Here I will limit myself to underline the strong asso-
nance with the words of Deleuze with regard to the rela-
tionship between repetition and habit (Deleuze [1968]: 
73-75).
118). In short, just as play always exhibits a resi-
due of rite, in rites a ludic aspect is always present. 
Play, however, although deriving from the ritual 
sphere, takes leave of it, breaking away from the 
tradition that legitimates and gives meaning to 
the ritual practice. What ceases to exist, accord-
ing to the fundamental pages of Émile Benve-
niste (1947), is the element of myth, the discursive 
order that founds and justifies rite. Toys, in this 
sense, are concrete crystallizations of this profana-
tory event. By deactivating old uses, children are 
constructing something new; destroying the origi-
nal context from which they extrapolate objects – 
the constituted order of myth –, they return them 
to the sphere of use, of experimentation and inno-
vation4.
It is precisely in infantile constructiveness that 
the aesthetic-anthropological origin of the mon-
tage principle must be found, and of the second 
technique that Benjamin spoke of in the essay on 
the Work of Art: indeed it reveals the intermediate 
space which invalidates all simplistic dichotomies 
between nature and history, nature and technique 
and gives life to the symbolic function. Paraphras-
ing Jean Piaget, playful repetition does not simply 
repeat «part of the adaptive behaviours», but it 
goes «beyond the limits of adaptation», applying 
«schemas already established for a non-ludic end» 
to objects that are always new and are not neces-
sarily connected to the constraints of the exter-
nal environment. It is therefore a repetition that, 
breaking away from rituality, produces continuous 
variations (Piaget [1945]: 89, 95). A repetition that 
maintains an intimate relationship with mimesis, if 
by this we mean not the simple identification-with 
or emulation-of the world of adults, but some-
thing, once again, that is essentially creative. The 
child, by incorporating things, and not by empa-
thizing with them, both constructs and individu-
ates them. Things are, through him or herself, 
always assembled, taken apart, destroyed, reas-
sembled and thus fixed and known in their many 
facets. This is something that differs greatly from 
creativity (ex nihilo, the work of a genius), under-
4 On the concept of profanation see also Agamben (2005).
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stood as an activity carried out by an autonomous 
and sovereign subject (Benjamin [1933a]: 720-
721; Benjamin [1929b]: 229): not only because 
in a child a clear distinction between the self and 
the world has yet to be formed, but because it is 
precisely through the mimetic and repetitive play 
that children construct both their own subjectiv-
ity and the external world (Benjamin [1926]: 449-
450); furthermore, it is because Benjamin reflected 
of this gesture as something that is always pro-
foundly underlain by relations, by a collective and 
social dimension, unlike what is claimed by the 
fictio of abstract individualism (Benjamin [1929a]: 
273). Playful repetition is therefore the source of 
symbolic activity, the condition of possibility not 
only of experience and of the rules shaping it, 
but of innovation tout court. Donald Winnicott 
described this process as a «potential space» inside 
which «transitional phenomena» are inscribed: 
a toy is the «first use […] of a symbol», and «the 
first not-me possession», the first not-me experi-
ence (Winnicott [1971]: 54-56, 130). This space, 
opened up by play, does not cease to operate, also 
later, especially in imaginative experience (artistic 
and cultural experience), because play is the origi-
nal area from which man can oppose the «infinite 
variability» of symbolic creation to the «stereo-
typy» of biological or environmental phenomena 
(Winnicott [1971]: 132). Thus, the ludic «doing 
the same thing over and over again» (das Noch 
einmal) is a «doing anew» (ein-Immer-wieder-tun) 
that expresses the innovative drive of human ani-
mals (Benjamin [1928b]: 120), a doing for which 
each repetition has a paradigmatic value.  
From an ontogenetic point of view, therefore, in 
children we see the work of the principle of mon-
tage which, at a historical and phylogenetic level, 
became visible with technical reproducibility. The 
prevalence of the pole of play in aesthetic expe-
rience – however historically determined –, as 
opposed to the cultual pole of semblance, in this 
sense has to do with what is a real anthropological 
trait.
The polarities underlying the Kunstwerkauf-
satz – the version offered by the new critical edi-
tion as third (Benjamin [1935-1936]) –, include 
what could be defined as the synchronic or hori-
zontal polarity between semblance (Schein) and 
play (Spiel) (see Lindner [2011]: 247-249; Desi-
deri [2012]: XXXIV): that is, the tension imma-
nent in every artwork, which constitutes and 
founds the very concept of artwork – its structure 
– also when the latter ceases to exist, because it is 
inscribed in the «the primal phenomenon of all 
artistic activity», that is mimesis (Benjamin [1936]: 
127). The hypothesis being put forward here is 
that this polarity provides the keystone not only 
to understand all other polarities, but also to grasp 
Benjamin’s «materialistic theory of art» (Benjamin 
[1910-1940]: 509). Furthermore, also here, if we 
keep in mind the conceptual range of the playful 
element elaborated by Benjamin, the role of rep-
etition is decisive, inasmuch as technical repro-
ducibility calls into question, precisely with its 
large-scale type of seriality, also a kind of differen-
tial and ludic repetition, differential because it is 
ludic – this is indeed the meaning of the Spiel-räu-
me, of the «new fields of action» or, we might say, 
spaces for play, at the center of the essay (Benja-
min [1936]: 118, 124, 127; see also Hansen [2004]; 
Lindner [2011]: 248-249).
As is well known, the definition of aura is 
intertwined with what Benjamin calls the cultual 
basis of art, therefore with the sacred and magi-
cal dimension, with the tradition that all religious 
or profane rituals establish and continue to trans-
mit over time. The hic et nunc of an artwork, its 
«uniqueness», originates within this horizon (Ben-
jamin [1936]: 105-106). The work of art in which 
the pole of semblance is dominant, is, in other 
words, a ritual device, part of the multiplicity of 
practices which, in addition to founding a commu-
nity, with its patterns of behaviour, its institutions 
and its symbolic systems, also guarantee their con-
tinuity over time. Ritual, in fact, is also what allows 
to continue to articulate tradition in the present. 
The cultual foundation of art thus displays a par-
adoxical character: if on the one hand the auratic 
artwork is described as a work possessing traits 
of uniqueness, of unrepeatability, a «once and for 
all» character (Benjamin [1936]: 107) – das Ein 
für allemal –, having not yet entered the mecha-
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nism of serial reproduction, on the other hand it 
is inserted in the cyclical, repetitive temporality 
of ritual. Benjamin speaks of a «unique apparition 
of a distance» (Benjamin [1936]: 104-105), which 
remains, and re-appears again, always with the 
function of re-legitimizing this circularity. In other 
words, it remains inextricably linked to mythical 
time, which freezes the same temporality within 
the cycle of the repetition of the identical.
This figuration establishes a specific relation-
ship with nature; in the third draft of the essay 
on the work of art, Benjamin defines it with the 
synthetic concept of «first technology». A char-
acteristic of the latter is that it aims to achieve 
«mastery over nature»: in societies in which «tech-
nology existed only in fusion with ritual» (Benja-
min [1936]: 107), its primary purpose is to tame 
natural forces, as these are perceived – to quote 
Ernesto De Martino (1948) – as a threat to one’s 
«presence». In short, the first technology operates 
by performing acts of exorcism of nature.
With the advent of technical reproducibility, 
«for the first time in world history» the work of 
art becomes emancipated «from its parasitic sub-
servience to ritual» (Benjamin [1936]: 106). The 
link between the actuality of what is reproduced 
and tradition is broken from the inside: artworks, 
exposed to an «ubiquitous and non-linear actual-
ization», are no longer characterized by the hic et 
nunc of their origin (Desideri [2013]: 39). It is a 
«symptomatic» process, its «significance extends 
far beyond the realm of art». What is radically 
upset is in fact tradition in its complexity, because 
of this tear in the process of transmission that 
causes the onset of the «crisis» of humanity. On 
the other hand, this tear also alludes to the pos-
sibility of an interruption, with ritual, of mythi-
cal temporality, and opens up the possibility of a 
«renewal of humanity» (Benjamin [1936]: 104). It 
is simultaneously the appearance of decline and of 
chance, because the shift of the perceptual para-
digm involves all of the fundamental relationships 
of man with nature, with technique, with history. 
What is at stake is the phenomenon that Benjamin 
also termed «poverty of experience» (Benjamin 
[1933b]: 732).
Therefore, from a diachronic point of view, 
when what is reproduced is released from tradi-
tion, the exhibition value predominates over cult 
value, so much that the function of artworks is 
distorted, and in parallel, on the synchronic plane, 
what occurs is an equally intense displacement of 
the barycenter towards the pole of play, away from 
the pole of semblance (Benjamin [1936]: 106-107, 
127-128). A shift that leads to a «qualitative trans-
formation» not only of the relationship between 
man, nature and technique, but of man himself 
as well as of nature: it is an anthropological pas-
sage, because what corresponds to a «second tech-
nology» (Benjamin [1936]: 107) is itself a «second 
nature» (eine zweite Natur) (Benjamin [1935-
1936]: 63), and «the traditional [...] image of man» 
is replaced by the barbaric and new image of «the 
naked man of the contemporary world», who 
is poor of experience (Benjamin [1933b]: 733). 
What characterizes this second technique is not an 
attempt to dominate, but «an interplay» – harmo-
nien, passionnée, following the Fourierian inspira-
tion – «between nature and humanity». Moreover, 
for the first time we witness human beings dis-
tancing themselves from nature (Benjamin [1936]: 
107, 124-125; Benjamin [1935-1936]: 173-174), 
where nature is understood as the nature of ritual, 
a danger to be tamed and domesticated, thought 
in dichotomic terms with respect to history, to 
technical artefacts. The «nature [...] of the second 
degree» that emerges with technical reproducibil-
ity, the result of the montage principle, well exem-
plified by the film editing process, is located on 
the threshold between natural and artificial, at the 
point of continuous passage from one to the other 
(Benjamin [1936]: 115).
We now understand the intrinsic political 
nature of Benjamin’s reflection on childhood: in 
childhood ludic activity, the profanatory gesture 
is already contained, able to tear objects from 
their traditional and auratic context, in order to 
return them to the sphere of use and experimen-
tation, where repetition and variation, destruction 
and re-composition, following orders that differ 
each time, are the creation of something that is 
always new. Children are the first actors of mon-
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tage, their play is already «the inexhaustible res-
ervoir of all the experimenting procedures» of the 
second technique (Benjamin [1936]: 127). Das 
Einmal ist keinmal, is an expression belonging to 
children’s play as much as it belongs to the second 
technique; das Ein für allemal characterizes the 
cultual foundation of art and the first technique, 
and thus the value of eternity and uniqueness 
prove to be empty (Benjamin [1935-1936]: 108): 
it is an auratic crystallization of a compulsion to 
repeat which actually re-institutes, each time, the 
identical. It is the same repetition that regulates 
the phantasmagoria of commodities: the modes of 
production of advanced capitalism exhibit, in an 
exemplary manner, the mystification of the rela-
tionship between always-identical and unique-
ness, where behind the compulsive overproduc-
tion of nouveauté lies the mythic compulsion to 
repeat the same (Benjamin [1927-1940]: 11). It is 
a compensatory action, as well as a mystification: 
when the aura ceases to be, this same aura, with 
all its cultual and magical value, is transferred into 
commodities. The same can be said of experience: 
the destruction of the latter is concealed by a con-
vulsive simulation of experiential shocks, in order 
to exorcise the poverty that characterizes mod-
ern man (Benjamin [1933b]: 732). What is hid-
den behind the eternal novelty and the presumed 
rebirth of auratic experiences is the always-iden-
tical, but also forms of reaction, and one in par-
ticular, the «aestheticizing of politics» is, among 
these, a privileged instrument (Benjamin [1936]: 
121). In other words, mature capitalism employs 
the second technique following the canons of the 
first: the problem it poses is not how to formulate 
proposals to improve nature5, but how to establish 
relations founded on dominion.
The fact that a historical shift has led to the 
emergence of the pole of play, however, does not 
mean that the conditions of liberation are already 
given. Technical reproduction does open up the 
space for play, the condition of possibility of a 
5 It is indeed a perfective mimesis (vollendende Mimesis), 
which operates with play and with the second technique 
(Benjamin [1935-1936]: 155).
uniqueness with no aura, but it is precisely in this 
space that the most bitter conflict with capitalism 
takes place. In the age of poverty of experience, 
in which man goes back to being a child with-
out habits, «a newborn babe» who shouts «in the 
dirty diapers of the present» (Benjamin [1933b]: 
733), groping in the construction of new cus-
toms, capitalism captures and enhances precisely 
this human capacity to re-accustom oneself every 
time from the beginning, to construct the new 
making do with little, and turns childhood into 
something chronic in order to extract value from 
what is a true anthropological trait (see Virno 
[2015]: 91-93). It is no coincidence that in ana-
lyzing the transformations of perception, Benja-
min insists on the question of habit, highlighting 
the tension between continuous perceptual shocks 
and the ability to get used to something all over 
again, which characterizes, in an essential way, 
all forms of contemporary experience: «the tasks 
which face the human apparatus of perception at 
historical turning points [...] are mastered gradually 
[...] through habit». And in the historical epoch 
of technical reproducibility we have seen that 
«even the distracted person can form habits»; it 
is «a covert measure of the extent to which it has 
become possible to perform new tasks of apper-
ception» (Benjamin [1936]: 120). Perhaps it is pre-
cisely here that the powerfully prognostic quality 
of Benjamin’s materialistic analysis emerges: in the 
comprehension of the intimate link between the 
playful repetition and the large-scale serialization 
of contemporary production; in the identification 
of the fundamental reconfiguration of capitalist 
exploitation in the tension between the absence of 
solid habits and the human capacity to re-acquire 
them; in an epoch in which capitalism has elevat-
ed childhood to the predominant form of life and 
has succeeded in extracting value also from pov-
erty of experience. It is starting from here, per-
haps, that the question of «politicizing art» must 
be rethought today, that of the renewal of human-
ity stemming from its own crisis. Once again, what 
must be rethought is art’s foundation in that «dif-
ferent practice» with respect to ritual, which is, 
precisely, «politics» (Benjamin [1936]: 122, 106).
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3. THE NOW OF REPEATABILITY
We have thus reached the problem concern-
ing the relationship between advanced capitalism 
and repetition; or, better, between the origin of 
the former and the idea of  history as an eternal 
recurrence of the identical which presents itself 
again in the nineteenth century. As is known, the 
passages – the «world in miniature» of this cen-
tury, «temples of commodity capital» – represent 
the Urphänomen through which Benjamin tries 
to grasp this connection. The pace set by indus-
trial work transforms the historical course into «a 
mass produced article», which repeats itself con-
tinuously as something always new and always 
the same (Benjamin [1927-1940]: 31, 37, 462, 
340). Fashion embodies the exemplum of a simi-
lar temporality: its being «eternally up-to-date» 
betrays, in the frenzy of its changes, the face of 
the eternal same. It is a time that «does not rec-
ognize death», and that, unlike the cycle of myth, 
proceeds by eliminating every break. The journey 
through the passages is «a ghost walk», at the end 
of which no palingenesis takes place. Passage: the 
name is a parody of itself, it generates an experi-
ence that is the opposite of that of the rite of pas-
sage (Benjamin [1927-1940]: 541, 66, 409, 494); 
not only are there no metamorphosis here, but 
man is returned, once the thresholds of birth and 
death have also been erased, «into the intrauterine 
world» (Benjamin [1927-1940]: 415; see also Desi-
deri [2002]: 112-113).
This is how the thought of the eternal recur-
rence rises again, and what is more, it becomes 
the «sky», against which «the people of the nine-
teenth century see the stars»: Louise-Auguste 
Blanqui and Friedrich Nietzsche stand out against 
the backdrop of this sky, and of Benjamin’s Passa-
gen-Werk. The vision of the cosmos as a «site of 
lingering catastrophes», which Blanqui describes 
in L’éternité par les astres, is, Benjamin writes, «a 
complement of the society to which [...] [he], in 
his old age, was forced to concede victory». The 
same idea according to which the universe con-
sists of a finite number of simple elements, there-
fore of an equally finite number of combinations-
types, condemned to repeat themselves infinite-
ly, is based on the «data from the mechanistic 
natural science of bourgeois society» (Benjamin 
[1927-1940]: 111-112; see also Blanqui [1872]). 
In short, this idea of repetition that Blanqui tries 
to assert at a cosmological level, prior to a his-
torical one, though it demystifies the ideology of 
progress, remains circumscribed to the categorical 
perimeter of modernity; in other words, because 
it is historically determined, it proves to be the 
other side of faith in progress. The same can be 
said for Nietzsche, whose idea of eternal recur-
rence «appeared at a time when the bourgeoisie 
no longer dared count on the impending develop-
ment of the system of production which they had 
set going», that is, as an unconscious and com-
pensatory response to the frenzy of mature capi-
talism (Benjamin [1927-1940]: 119, 117). Amor 
fati and the willing of the Nietzschean eternal 
recurrence, as the «most extreme form of nihil-
ism and its overcoming», treat the archaic circu-
lar vision of becoming as «a philosophic yardstick 
by which to measure the experience of time and 
of the temporal», and thus point to the overcom-
ing of time itself, to the dissolution of its frenzy 
(Löwith [1935]: 156, 136). One must mention also 
Kierkegaard in this regard, although he appears 
less frequently in the preparatory notes for the 
Passages: he is more closely linked to the concept 
of bourgeois intérieur, which, however, is also 
inscribed in the overall framework of the phantas-
magorias of repetition that take root in this epoch, 
as a superstructural counterpoint to the pro-
cess of reification of social life. Benjamin quotes 
Adorno, according to whom inwardness – which 
the Danish thinker opposed to the misery gener-
ated by the capitalist world – is «the historical 
prison of a primordial humanity», in which things 
are not only estranged from their essence, but 
also subjected to the sphere of appearance, con-
demned to the order of the ever-selfsame (Ben-
jamin [1933c]: 704; see also Adorno [1933]). In 
the contrast between nostalgia for a lost authen-
ticity and the imposition of the law of commodi-
ties, the Kierkegaardian characters – Constantius 
in Repetition is exemplary – display an allegori-
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cal rigidity that forces them to repeat themselves 
infinitely. The repetitive gesture of Constantius/
Kierkegaard thus represents a titanic attempt to 
return to an authentic dimension; and this, how-
ever, is only possible by entering the religious 
sphere (see Kiekegaard [1843]). It is an act that 
once again confirms, according to Benjamin, the 
fact that Kierkegaard’s reflection – the latecomer 
of German idealism – is still underlain by a myth-
ical quality (Benjamin [1933c]; see also Benjamin 
[1927-1940]: 218-220, 548).
But we would like here to try to radicalise 
Benjamin’s intuition, going beyond the immediate 
connection between the frantic and serial rhythms 
of industrial work and the idea that  the histori-
cal course is an endless recurrence of the same. 
It is in commodity, as an elementary unit of the 
capitalist process of value extraction, that Benja-
min identifies the material matrix of the histori-
cal temporality of the modern era. A matrix that 
must be viewed in terms of an expressive rela-
tionship/correspondence and not in terms of a 
causal-deterministic relationship (see Benjamin 
[1927-1940]: 460). The becoming-myth of capital 
must be sought, following Lukács, in the process 
by which commodity becomes «the universal cat-
egory of society», «the dominant form» of «every 
expression of life», so much that it becomes «sec-
ond nature», in the most disturbing sense of the 
expression (Lukács [1923]: 86, 84). In my opin-
ion, it is necessary to take a further step back, 
and proceed from a quote of Marx present in the 
Passagenarbeit (the same quote will also appear in 
the Theses), the importance of which is stressed 
by Benjamin. The passage concerns the creative 
dimension of work – the very concept of «creative 
(des Schöpferischen)» –, at the beginning of the 
The Critique of the Gotha Program, where Marx 
states that «Labor is the source (die Quelle) of all 
wealth and all culture» (Benjamin [1927-1940]: 
658). Here we can identify a reference to the 
founding act of capital: according to Marx, what 
makes the creation of value possible is, well before 
commodity, «labour as subjectivity», the worker as 
a living subject, as «living labour» (Marx [1867]: 
217; Marx [1857-1858]: 272). Once the source of 
value is captured – what Marx also calls primitive 
accumulation (see Marx [1867]: 784-848) –, capi-
tal becomes foundational, a totality incorporating 
everything, a mythical system that transfigures 
the historically determined quality of one’s own 
modes and relations of production turning them 
into a law of nature. But in order for this transfig-
uration to take root, the origin must be reiterated: 
such a process of naturalization of social relations 
is in fact possible only starting from the continu-
ous concealment of the creative source of value 
(see Dussel [1990]: 334-384). In Benjamin’s words, 
this is the «bad infinity in the movement of capi-
tal» (Benjamin [1939]: 1177).
On the other hand, at a subjective and con-
science level, the idea of  eternal recurrence affirms 
itself again, as mentioned above, as an effect of 
the destruction of experience in the sense of 
Erfahrung. Factory work and metropolitan phan-
tasmagoria fragment the nineteenth-century man, 
overwhelm him with an unlimited amount of per-
ceptual shocks, which, disconnected from each 
other, are repeated without pause. The eternal 
recurrence thus resurfaces also as compensation 
for the «atrophy of experience»: deriving «its lus-
ter from the fact that it [...] [is] no longer possi-
ble, in all circumstances, to expect a recurrence of 
conditions across any interval of time shorter than 
that provided by eternity» (Benjamin [1927-1940]: 
804, 340).
We are therefore able to understand why 
Baudelaire can allude to the interruption of this 
phantasmagorical repetition: because, like the alle-
gorist, the brooder, insinuates himself between the 
equivocality of the signifiers, between the theologi-
cal whims of the commodities, reviews them play-
fully to show their historical index. He broadens 
the infernal repetition once more to overturn it in 
a constructive reiteration (Benjamin [1927-1940]: 
328, 368-369). Neither the heroic Nietzschean 
composure, nor the resignation of Blanqui, nor the 
nostalgia of Kierkegaard, but the new to be wrest-
ed from the ever-selfsame constitutes the «deep-
est intention» of his poetry, of his life (Benjamin 
[1938-1939]: 175; Benjamin [1927-1940]: 318).
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Unlike Adorno, who understands the dialectic 
between the archaic and the modern as an inter-
minable movement, Benjamin thinks of this rela-
tionship starting from the disintegration of myth, 
from the image of the redeemed world or, in pro-
fane terms, of revolution. This disruption coincides 
with the dissolution of the phantasmagoria of the 
«repetition in history». «To dissipate the semblance 
of eternal sameness», this is the task of dialecti-
cal experience (Benjamin [1927-1940]: 473); see 
also Harrootunian [1996]). Freed from the shack-
les of the ideology of progress, historical material-
ism, in fact, placing itself near the economic and 
therefore historically determined matrix of social 
phenomena, shatters the semblance of eternity of 
these same phenomena. Benjamin, however, takes 
one step further – thus the originality of his reflec-
tion: using the «historical index» of images as the 
zero point for their knowledge means not only to 
assume that «they belong to a particular time», 
but also and above all, that «they attain to legibil-
ity (Lesbarkeit) only at a particular time», regard-
less of the intentio of the knowing subject. This is 
the heart of the concept of dialektisches Bild (Ben-
jamin [1927-1940]: 462-463). The materialist his-
torian must therefore be able to grasp, in the now 
of their recognizability, before they flee, the critical 
constellations that emerge from the vortex of his-
torical substance, from the dialectic movement of 
repetition and uniqueness of the Ursprung. Because 
these are indeed unrepeatable combinations. Once 
the heroic-individualistic traits have been elimi-
nated, the youthful and Nietzschean suggestions 
resurface here: the historian capable of grasping 
such a moment is in fact the one that is guided by 
the filter of the present, by the principle of actual-
ization. The present is the dynamite with which to 
blow up the semblance both of historical repetition 
and of progress, of the linearity and homogene-
ity of the temporal course (Benjamin [1927-1940]: 
460, 474). Thus, in the difference of each new 
combination with the present, the past no longer 
appears as something which has been once and for 
all, indeed it is reopened: at the moment – histori-
cally determined – in which it is becomes legible 
again, entering a critical constellation with the pre-
sent, the horizon of its outcomes opens up again, 
becoming once again a battlefield. What Benjamin 
sheds a light on is the broadening of the repetitive 
gesture, the virtuous combination of repetition, 
destruction and construction: the emergence of the 
dialectical image necessarily implies a «destructive 
momentum» that blasts the «historical continuity» 
to the point it is demolished, although, conversely, 
new configurations between past and present can 
arise only if what has been is retraced and, there-
fore, repeated (Benjamin [1927-1940]: 462, 475) .
This repetition is intimately constructive; 
again, it has to do with the «principle of montage» 
and with use. Behind the figure of the material-
ist historian we can still see that of the child, or 
of the citationist: who uses, cites elements of his-
torical substance, who is attracted by rags, by the 
refuse of history; he extrapolates these from their 
original context, he takes them apart and destroys 
them to reassemble them according to orders that 
have never seen before (Benjamin [1927-1940]: 
458, 460-461).
The now of recognizability thus coincides with 
a now of repeatability: the dialectical image, or – it 
is the same thing – the revolutionary chance cor-
respond to a crystallization within the already 
repetitive activity of recollection of the past. What 
is reiterated and actualized is a certain fragment of 
the past that has never been, that demands to be 
accomplished. History is therefore not a complet-
ed work, but something that asks to be reopened, 
re-exposed to the sphere of possibility (Benjamin 
[1937]: 267). The object of historical knowledge 
presents itself as a monad, as an absolutely sin-
gular concretion in which virtually all the occur-
rence of a given fact is contained, its «fore-histo-
ry» as well as its «after-history» (Benjamin [1927-
1940]: 475). This virtuality coexists alongside what 
has been and what is, it does not cease to be actu-
alized until all its possibilities are fulfilled, «until 
the entire past is brought into the present in a 
historical apocatastasis»6, until it is «citable» (zi-
tierbar) in every part (Benjamin [1927-1940]: 459; 
6 On the concept of apocatastasis in Benjamin see Deside-
ri (2016).
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Benjamin [1940a]: 390). It is the same form of 
language, of languages, that are, in their essence, 
translatable, and that require to be translated. The 
suffix -barkeit – of Erkennbarkeit, Lesbarkeit, Zi-
tierbarkeit, Übersetzbarkeit, and also of Reprodu- 
zierbarkeit – names exactly this form: the past 
(just like language or artworks), regardless of 
whether it is empirically known, read, cited, 
requires this a priori, it requires this to be still pos-
sible, it requires its own repetition and remem-
brance, release and redemption (see Benjamin 
[1921c]: 254; Benjamin [1916c]: 60-70)7. To elimi-
nate the ineffable, to accomplish the uncompleted, 
are the two faces of the same messianic-revolu-
tionary gesture.
It thus becomes clear why the theological cat-
egory of remembrance is not exclusively contem-
plative, but is intimately linked to redemption, and 
why this link has a profane correspondence in the 
connection between historiography and politics 
(Benjamin [1940b]: 110-111). It is no coincidence 
that Benjamin uses the term Eingedenken: unlike 
An-denken (souvenir) that catalogues the past «as 
dead effects» (Benjamin [1938-1939]: 183), the 
Eingedenken slips into the (ein) threads of histo-
ry, to break, to reassemble – to profanate – their 
fabric, to re-assemble it according to new combi-
nations, useful for present action. A usefulness to 
be understood in its literal sense: because it is the 
result of an unprecedented use of the past and, 
simultaneously, of the use of current revolution-
ary praxis. Thus «the small gateway» from which 
the Messiah can enter at any time, or through 
which the revolutionary situation is unleashed, 
is where one must grasp the possibility that still 
lives within the past (Benjamin [1940a]: 397). It is 
the opening that has a very particular spatial and 
temporal nature, the revolutionary opportunity in 
fact emerges in the interferences, inside «time dif-
ferentials», produced each time by this repetition 
of what has been. Also here the model of intensive 
time, of the messianic dimension, plays a decisive 
role: it gathers «the entire history of mankind» in 
a «single focal point», comprising it «in a tremen-
7 On the -barkeiten in Benjamin see Weber (2008).
dous abbreviation» (Benjamin [1915a]: 37; Benja-
min [1940a]: 396). What emerges here is a sort of 
double movement of repetition: if on the one hand 
it appears as remembrance, which retraces a sin-
gle event, on the other hand, in the arrest of time 
brought on by the critical constellation, repetition 
takes place in a contracted form, as an integral 
recapitulation of history, in the form of a living 
mirror, allowing for a certain perspective angle, of 
the history of the whole universe. The Jetztzeit, the 
present understood as actuality, is therefore not an 
infinite transition; on the contrary, it is a «breath» 
in which, for an instant, «becoming» is entirely 
withheld – the moment, intimately fleeting, in 
which the features of eternity appear in a flash 
only to disappear (Benjamin [1940a]: 396; see also 
Desideri [1995]: 160).
In conclusion, I would like to attempt to dem-
onstrate that also the ethical nuance of Benjamin’s 
thought is intimately linked to the concept of 
repetition. Where by ethics, in line with Aristo-
tle, we mean the search for the highest good that 
is happiness. In the hermetic text titled Agesilaus 
Santander, Benjamin clearly states that the angel 
– objectum meditationis of these pages – «wants 
happiness – that is to say, the conflict in which the 
rapture of the unique, the new, the yet unborn is 
combined with that bliss of experiencing some-
thing once more, of possessing once again, of hav-
ing lived» (Benjamin [1933d]: 715). Here I will 
not dwell on the exegesis of this figure – a per-
sonal or Talmudic angel, a messenger, the emblem 
that conceals the anagram of Benjamin’s name? 
(see Scholem [1972]; Agamben [1982]; Montanelli 
[2017]: 137-145) – what matters is the identifica-
tion of happiness in the contrast between radical 
novelty of what has not yet been lived and the 
repetition of what has been (see also Benjamin 
[1938-1939]: 184). Benjamin then adds: «he has 
nothing new to hope for on any road other than 
the road home». The new stems from the recovery 
of what has been, and what is at stake here is the 
temporal form, capable of reopening the past, of 
remembrance. The angel drags the man away with 
him «to the future along which he came» (Ben-
jamin [1933d]: 715). It is therefore not a coinci-
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dence between future and return of the past, des-
tination and provenance. Unlike what Scholem 
(1972) claimed, Benjamin here is not thinking of 
a cyclical conception of the historical process: the 
«future» is the future of what is «yet unborn», the 
movement of what returns implies differences, 
intensive variations. The origin is indeed the goal, 
as is said in the line by Karl Kraus that Benja-
min uses as epigraph to the XIV thesis (Benjamin 
[1940a]: 395), however, to move towards it means 
opening it up to the possibility of new configura-
tions: to retrace the already experienced means 
to fulfil what has not yet taken place inside it, to 
repeat the unrepeatable. Happiness is therefore a 
profane category – also in Benjamin’s early Theo-
logical-Political Fragment, however still strongly 
nihilistic –, it interrogates the time of the shat-
tered mystical instant, of the allegorical erup-
tion of eternal transience (Benjamin [1920-1923]: 
305-306; Benjamin [1927-1940]: 348). Wanting 
the downfall of all things is the gesture that can 
break the eternal recurrence of the same, because 
it repeats historical events once more to virtually 
actualize the totality of their possibilities.
It is in the second thesis of On the concept 
of history that Benjamin goes back to the cor-
respondence between (profane) happiness and 
(theological) redemption. Happiness, which must 
orient the revolutionary practice of historical 
materialism, is directed to what has been: it is the 
movement capable of transforming the past condi-
tional – of everything that one would have wanted 
to be or do, but that has not been, or has not done 
– into the futur antérieur, into the time which 
reopens what has been, exposing it once again to 
modification, letting possibility retroact on real-
ity. Each generation is then expected – and not 
just thrown – on earth, because it has the power, 
albeit weak, to reactualize what has been, in order 
to allow what has not been fulfilled, in it, to finally 
take place (Benjamin [1940a]: 389-390; see also 
Lindner [2002]).
Happiness thus coincides with the memory 
of the future – futur antérieur is exactly this –, it 
is the taking place of what did not take place in 
the past. The past wrongs are not disregarded, on 
the contrary, there is an «increasing concentration 
(integration) of reality, such that everything past 
(in its time) can acquire a higher grade of actuali-
ty than it had in the moment of its existing» (Ben-
jamin [1927-1940]: 392; see also Benjamin [1927-
1940]: 471).
As in the world of Kafka, the figures for which 
perhaps «there is hope» are those «mist-bound 
creatures, beings in an unfinished state» – assis-
tants, fools, messengers, students, children – who, 
precisely because they are unfinished or helpless, 
retain the power of possibility (Benjamin [1934]: 
798-799). They are figures of memory, of atten-
tiveness, which act as a counterpoint to the ones 
distorted by the weight of oblivion  (Benjamin 
[1934]: 806-812). The crazy, the helpers, the stu-
dents «don’t get tired»; children never want to go 
to sleep, because «while they are asleep, something 
might happen that concerns them»: these figures 
watch over the possible that in every instant could 
re-open and repeat itself. For them «the great 
rules of asceticism operate», the ancient warn-
ing that orders: «Don’t forget the best!» (Benja-
min [1934]: 813). This «best» is the possible itself. 
And it is in this gesture, able to «remember the 
new once again» (Benjamin [1927-1940]: 855) that 




Benjamin, W., 1910-1940: The Correspondence of 
Walter Benjamin. 1910-1940, transl. by M.R. 
Jacobson and E.M. Jacobson, ed. and annoted 
by G. Scholem and T.W. Adorno, The Univer-
sity of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1994.
Benjamin, W., 1911a: Sleeping Beauty, in Early 
Writings. 1910-1917, transl. by H. Eiland and 
Others, The Belknap Press of Harvard Univer-
sity Press, Cambridge (Mass.)-London, 2011, 
pp. 26-32.
Benjamin, W., 1911b: The Free School Commu-
nity, in Early Writings. 1910-1917, transl. by 
H. Eiland and Others, The Belknap Press of 
275Walter Benjamin and the Principle of Repetition
Harvard University Press, Cambridge (Mass.)-
London, 2011, pp. 39-45.
Benjamin, W., 1912: Dialogue on the Religiosity 
of the Present, in Early Writings. 1910-1917, 
transl. by H. Eiland and Others, The Belknap 
Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge 
(Mass.)-London, 2011, pp. 62-84.
Benjamin, W., 1913a: Teaching and Valuation, in 
Early Writings. 1910-1917, transl. by H. Eiland 
and Others, The Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge (Mass.)-London, 
2011, pp. 90-100.
Benjamin, W., 1913b: Thoughts on Gerhart Haupt-
mann’s Festival Play, in Early Writings. 1910-
1917, transl. by H. Eiland and Others, The 
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge (Mass.)-London, 2011, pp. 120-
125.
Benjamin, W., 1914a: The Religious Position of 
the New Youth, in Early Writings. 1910-1917, 
transl. by H. Eiland and Others, The Belknap 
Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge 
(Mass.)-London, 2011, pp. 168-170.
Benjamin, W., 1914b: The Metaphysics of Youth, in 
Selected Writings. Volume 1: 1913-1926, ed. by 
M. Bullock and M.W. Jennings, The Belknap 
Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge 
(Mass.)-London, 1996, pp. 6-17. 
Benjamin, W., 1915a: The Life of Students, in 
Selected Writings. Volume 1: 1913-1926, ed. by 
M. Bullock and M.W. Jennings, The Belknap 
Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge 
(Mass.)-London, 1996, pp. 37-47.
Benjamin, W., 1915b: Two Poems by Friedrich 
Hölderlin, in Selected Writings. Volume 1: 1913-
1926, ed. by M. Bullock and M.W. Jennings, 
The Belknap Press of Harvard University 
Press, Cambridge (Mass.)-London, 1996, pp. 
18-36.
Benjamin, W., 1916a: The Role of Language in 
Trauerspiel and Tragedy, in Selected Writings. 
Volume 1: 1913-1926, ed. by M. Bullock and 
M.W. Jennings, The Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge (Mass.)-London, 
1996, pp. 59-61.
Benjamin, W., 1916b: Trauerspiel and Tragedy, in 
Selected Writings. Volume 1: 1913-1926, ed. by 
M. Bullock and M.W. Jennings, The Belknap 
Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge 
(Mass.)-London, 1996, pp. 55-58.
Benjamin, W., 1916c: On Language as Such and 
on the Language of Man, in Selected Writings. 
Volume 1: 1913-1926, ed. by M. Bullock and 
M.W. Jennings, The Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge (Mass.)-London, 
1996, pp. 62-74.
Benjamin, W., 1919: Fate and Character, in Select-
ed Writings. Volume 1: 1913-1926, ed. by M. 
Bullock and M.W. Jennings, The Belknap 
Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge 
(Mass.)-London, 1996, pp. 201-206.
Benjamin, W., 1920-1923: Theological-Political 
Fragment, in Selected Writings. Volume 3: 
1935-1938, ed. by H. Eiland and M.W. Jen-
nings, The Belknap Press of Harvard Univer-
sity Press, Cambridge (Mass.)-London, 2006, 
pp. 305-306.
Benjamin, W., 1921a: Critique of Violence, in 
Selected Writings. Volume 1: 1913-1926, ed. by 
M. Bullock and M.W. Jennings, The Belknap 
Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge 
(Mass.)-London, 1996, pp. 236-252.
Benjamin, W., 1921b: Capitalism as Religion, in 
Selected Writings. Volume 1: 1913-1926, ed. by 
M. Bullock and M.W. Jennings, The Belknap 
Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge 
(Mass.)-London, 1996, pp. 288-291.
Benjamin, W., 1921c: The Task of the Translator, in 
Selected Writings. Volume 1: 1913-1926, ed. by 
M. Bullock and M.W. Jennings, The Belknap 
Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge 
(Mass.)-London, 1996, pp. 253-263.
Benjamin, W., 1922: Goethe’s Elective Affinities, in 
Selected Writings. Volume 1: 1913-1926, ed. by 
M. Bullock and M.W. Jennings, The Belknap 
Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge 
(Mass.)-London, 1996, pp. 297-360.
Benjamin, W., 1925: The Origin of German Tragic 
Drama, transl. by J. Osborne, Verso, London-
New York, 2003. 
Benjamin, W., 1926: One-Way Street, in Selected 
Writings. Volume 1: 1913-1926, ed. by M. Bul-
276 Marina Montanelli
lock and M.W. Jennings, The Belknap Press of 
Harvard University Press, Cambridge (Mass.)-
London, 1996, pp. 444-488.
Benjamin, W., 1927-1940: The Arcades Project, 
transl. by H. Eiland and K. McLaughlin, The 
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge (Mass.)-London, 1999.
Benjamin, W., 1928a: Old Toys, in Selected Writ-
ings. Volume 2, Part 1: 1927-1930, ed. by M. 
W. Jennings, H. Eiland, G. Smith, The Belknap 
Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge 
(Mass.)-London, 2005, pp. 98-102.
Benjamin, W., 1928b: Toys and Play, in Selected 
Writings. Volume 2, Part 1: 1927-1930, ed. 
by M.W. Jennings, H. Eiland, G. Smith, The 
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge (Mass.)-London, 2005, pp. 117-
121.
Benjamin, W., 1929a: A Communist Pedagogy, in 
Selected Writings. Volume 2, Part 1: 1927-1930, 
ed. by M.W. Jennings, H. Eiland, G. Smith, 
The Belknap Press of Harvard University 
Press, Cambridge (Mass.)-London, 2005, pp. 
273-275.
Benjamin, W., 1929b: Hartlaub. «Der Genius im 
Kinde. Ein Versuch über die zeichnerische 
Anlage des Kindes (2. stark umgearbeitete und 
erweiterte Auflage)», in Werke und Nachlaß. 
Kritische Gesamtausgabe, Volume 13, Part 1, 
ed. by H.v. Kaulen, Suhrkamp, Berlin, 2011, 
pp. 228-229.
Benjamin, W., 1930: Russian Toys, in Moscow 
Diary, transl. by R. Sieburth, ed. by G. Smith, 
Harvard University Press, Cambridge (Mass.)-
London, 1986, pp. 123-124.
Benjamin, W., 1933a: On the Mimetic Faculty, in 
Selected Writings. Volume 2, Part 2: 1931-1934, 
ed. by M.W. Jennings, H. Eiland, G. Smith, 
The Belknap Press of Harvard University 
Press, Cambridge (Mass.)-London, 2005, pp. 
720-722.
Benjamin, W., 1933b: Experience and Poverty, in 
Selected Writings. Volume 2, Part 2: 1931-1934, 
ed. by M.W. Jennings, H. Eiland, G. Smith, 
The Belknap Press of Harvard University 
Press, Cambridge (Mass.)-London, 2005, pp. 
731-736.
Benjamin, W., 1933c: Kierkegaard, in Selected 
Writings. Volume 2, Part 2: 1931-1934, ed. 
by M.W. Jennings, H. Eiland, G. Smith, The 
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge (Mass.)-London, 2005, pp. 703-
705.
Benjamin, W., 1933d: Agesilaus Santander (Second 
Version), in Selected Writings. Volume 2, Part 
2: 1931-1934, ed. by M.W. Jennings, H. Eiland, 
G. Smith, The Belknap Press of Harvard Uni-
versity Press, Cambridge (Mass.)-London, 
2005, pp. 714-716.
Benjamin, W., 1934: Franz Kafka. On the Tenth 
Anniversary of His Death, in Selected Writ-
ings. Volume 2, Part 2: 1931-1934, ed. by M. 
W. Jennings, H. Eiland, G. Smith, The Belknap 
Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge 
(Mass.)-London, 2005, pp. 794-818.
Benjamin, W., 1935-1936: Das Kunstwerk im Zeit-
alter seiner technischen Reproduzierbarkeit, in 
Werke und Nachlaß. Kritische Gesamtausgabe, 
Volume 16, ed. by B. Lindner, Suhrkamp, Ber-
lin, 2013.
Benjamin, W., 1936: The Work of Art in the Age 
of Its Technological Reproducibility, in Select-
ed Writings. Volume 3: 1935-1938, ed. by 
H. Eiland and M.W. Jennings, The Belknap 
Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge 
(Mass.)-London, 2006, pp. 101-133.
Benjamin, W., 1937: Eduard Fuchs, Collector and 
Historian, in Selected Writings. Volume 3: 1935-
1938, ed. by H. Eiland and M.W. Jennings, The 
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge (Mass.)-London, 2006, pp. 260-
302.
Benjamin, W., 1938-1939: Central Park, in Select-
ed Writings. Volume 4: 1938-1940, ed. by 
H. Eiland and M.W. Jennings, The Belknap 
Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge 
(Mass.)-London, 2006, pp. 161-199.
Benjamin, W., 1939: Aus einer Niederschrift, in 
Gesammelte Schriften, Volume 1, Part 3, ed. 
by H. Schweppenhäuser and R. Tiedemann, 
Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a.M., 1974, pp. 1175-
1181.
277Walter Benjamin and the Principle of Repetition
Benjamin, W., 1940a: On the Concept of History, 
in Selected Writings. Volume 4: 1938-1940, ed. 
by H. Eiland and M.W. Jennings, The Belknap 
Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge 
(Mass.)-London, 2006, pp. 389-400. 
Benjamin, W., 1940b: Über den Begriff der 
Geschichte, in Werke und Nachlaß. Kritische 
Gesamtausgabe, Volume 19, ed. by G. Raulet, 
Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a.M., 2010.
Other Authors:
Adorno, T.W., 1933: Kierkegaard. Construction of 
the Aesthetic, transl. and ed. by R. Hullot-Ken-
tor, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapo-
lis, 1989.
Agamben, G., 1982: Walter Benjamin and the 
Demonic. Happiness and Historical Redemp-
tion, in Potentialities. Collected Essays in Phi-
losophy, ed. and transl. by D. Heller-Roazen, 
Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1991, pp. 
138-157. 
Agamben, G., 2005: Profanations, transl. by J. Fort, 
The MIT Press, Cambridge (Mass.), 2015.
Angehrn, E., 2001: Die Unabgeschlossenheit des 
Vergangenen: Erinnerung, Wiederholung und 
Neubeginn bei Walter Benjamin und Jacques 
Derrida, “RISS. Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse” 
51 (2), pp. 43-62.
Benveniste, E., 1947: Le Jeu comme Structure, 
“Deucalion” 2, pp. 161-167.
Blanqui, L.A., 1872: Eternity by the Stars. An 
Astronomical Hypothesis, transl. by F. Chou-
raqui, Contra Mundum Press, New York, 2013.
De Martino, E., 1948: The World of Magic, transl. 
by P.S. White, Pyramid Communications, New 
York, 1972.
Deleuze, G., 1968: Difference and Repetition, 
transl. by P. Patton, Columbia University Press, 
New York, 1994.
Desideri, F., 1995: Ad vocem Jetztzeit, in La porta 
della giustizia. Saggi su Walter Benjamin, Pen-
dragon, Bologna, pp. 153-166.
Desideri, F., 2002: Il fantasma dell’opera. Benjamin, 
Adorno e le aporie dell’arte contemporanea, Il 
Melangolo, Genova.
Desideri, F., 2012: I Modern Times di Benjamin, in 
Benjamin, W., L’opera d’arte nell’epoca della sua 
riproducibilità tecnica. Tre versioni (1936-39), 
ed. by F. Desideri, transl. by M. Baldi, Donzel-
li, Roma, pp. VII-XLV.
Desideri, F., 2013: Aura ex machina, “Rivista di 
estetica” 52 (1), pp. 33-52.
Desideri, F., 2016: Intermittency: the differential 
of time and the integral of space. The intensive 
spatiality of the Monad, the Apokatastasis and 
the Messianic World in Benjamin’s latest think-
ing, “Aisthesis” 9 (1), pp. 177-187.
Dussel, E., 1990: El ultimo Marx y la filosofía de la 
liberación, Siglo XXI, México D.F.
Eliade, M., 1949: The Myth of the Eternal Return. 
Cosmos and History, transl. by W. Trask, 
Princeton of University Press, Princeton, 2005.
Fenves, P., 2011: The Messianic Reduction. Walter 
Benjamin and the Shape of Time, Stanford Uni-
versity Press, Stanford.
Freud, S., 1921: Beyond the Pleasure Principle, ed. 
by E. Jones, The International Psycho-Analyti-
cal Press, London-Vienna, 1922.
Guglielminetti, E., 1990: Walter Benjamin. Tempo, 
ripetizione, equivocità, Mursia, Milano.
Hansen, M.B., 2004: Room-for-Play: Benjamin’s 
Gamble with Cinema, “October” 109, pp. 3-45.
Harrootunian, H.D., 1996: The Benjamin Effect: 
Modernism, Repetition, and the Path to Differ-
ent Cultural Immaginaries, in Steinberg, M.P. 
(ed.), Walter Benjamin and the Demands of 
History, Cornell University Press, New York, 
pp. 62-87.
Haxthausen, C.W., 2004: Reproduction/Repetition: 
Walter Benjamin/Carl Einstein, “October” 107, 
pp. 47-74.
Katz, M., 1998: Rendezvous in Berlin: Benjamin 
and Kierkegaard on the Architecture of Repeti-
tion, “The German Quarterly” 71, pp. 1-13. 
Kaufmann, S., 2002: Mit Walter Benjamin im 
“Théâtre Moderne” oder: Die unheimliche Mo-
derne. Szenen der Wiederholung, Königshausen 
& Neumann, Würzburg.
Kierkegaard, S., 1843: Repetition, in Repetition and 
Philosophical Crumbs, transl. by M.G. Piety, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009, pp. 1-82.
278 Marina Montanelli
Lindner, B., 2002: Zeit und Glück. Phantasmago-
rien des Spielraums, in Geyer-Ryan, H., Koop-
man, P., Yntema, K. (eds.), Benjamin Studies/
Studien 1. Perception and Experience in Moder-
nity, Rodopi B. V., Amsterdam-New York, pp. 
127-144.
Lindner, B., 2011: «Das Kunstwerk im Zeital-
ter seiner technischen Reproduzierbarkeit», in 
Lindner, B. (ed.), Benjamin-Handbuch. Leben-
Werk-Wirkung, J.B. Metzler, Stuttgart, pp. 229-
251.
Löwith, K., 1935: Nietzsche’s Philosophy of the Eter-
nal Recurrence of the Same, transl. by J. Harvey 
Lomax, University of California Press, Berke-
ley-Los Angeles-London, 1997.
Lukács, G., 1911: The Metaphysics of Tragedy, in 
Soul and Form, transl. by A. Bostock, The MIT 
Press, Cambridge (Mass.), 1974, pp. 152-174.
Lukács, G., 1923: History and Class Consciousness, 
transl. by R. Livingstone, The MIT Press, Cam-
bridge (Mass.), 1971.
Marx, K., 1857-1858: Grundrisse. Foundations 
of the Critique of Political Economy (Rough 
Draft), transl. by M. Nicolaus, Penguin, Lon-
don, 1993.
Marx, K., 1867: Capital. A Critique of Political 
Economy, transl. by S. Moore and E. Aveling, 
ed. by F. Engels, The Modern Library, New 
York, 1906.
Menninghaus, W., 1986: Schwellenkunde. Wal-
ter Benjamins Passage des Mythos, Suhrkamp, 
Frankfurt a.M.
Montanelli, M., 2017: Il principio ripetizione. Stu-
dio su Walter Benjamin, Mimesis, Milano-
Udine.
Nietzsche, F., 1874: On the Advantage and Disad-
vantage of History for Life, transl. by P. Preuss, 
Hackett Publishing Company, Indianapolis-
Cambridge, 1980.
Piaget, J., 1945: Play, Dreams and Imitation in 
Childhood, transl. by C. Gattegno and F.M. 
Hodgson, Routledge, London, 1999.
Rang, F.C., 1927: Historische Psychologie des Kar-
nevals, Brinkmann & Bose, Berlin, 1984.
Scholem, G., 1972: Walter Benjamin and his Angel, 
in Smith, G. (ed.), On Walter Benjamin. Criti-
cal Essays and Recollections, The MIT Press, 
Cambridge (Mass.), 1991, pp. 51-89. 
Virno, P., 2015: L’idea di mondo. Intelletto pubblico 
e uso della vita, Quodlibet, Macerata.
Weber, S., 2008: Benjamin’s -abilities, Harvard Uni-
versity Press, Cambridge (Mass.).
Werner, N., 2015: Archäologie des Erinnerns. Sig-
mund Freud in Walter Benjamins Berliner 
Kindheit, Wallstein, Göttingen.
Winnicott, D., 1971: Playing and Reality, Rout-
ledge, London-New York, 2005. 
